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Preferences and Social Influence∗
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Abstract
Interaction between decision makers may affect their preferences.
We consider a setup in which each individual is characterized by two
sets of preferences: his unchanged core preferences and his behavioral
preferences. Each individual has a social influence function that de-
termines his behavioral preferences given his core preferences and the
behavioral preferences of other individuals in his group. Decisions are
made according to behavioral preferences. The paper considers dif-
ferent properties of these social influence functions and their effect on
equilibrium behavior.
Keywords: Risk aversion, social influence, behavioral preferences.
1 Introduction
Consider a person sitting by himself in an empty restaurant, looking over
the menu in order to decide what to order. Now consider a slightly different
scenario in which the same person is sitting to a long table together with
other people, each of them in the process of ordering their meals. They may
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comment about their preferences, but as they don’t have any information
about the dishes they do not make remarks regarding the menu.1 Do we
expect the diner to order the same dish? Standard analysis seems to suggest
that the choice should be the same in both situations and that each individual
will choose the dish that he likes best. Yet, Ariely and Levav [1] provide a
convincing experiment that suggests that this is not the case and that the
presence of a group (even of complete strangers) affects the choice of meals.
Specifically, they found a larger variance in the dishes ordered by individuals
that were part of a group than by individuals that were sitting by themselves.
The group effect on preferences and attitudes has been extensively dis-
cussed in social psychology. One of the well-documented effects is the phe-
nomenon of group polarization, where group interactions make group mem-
bers more extreme than their initial inclination. For example, Myers [26]
reports the effect of group discussion on women with moderately feminist
views, that following a group interaction demonstrate stronger feminist views.
Focusing on attitude towards risky choices, Aronson [2, p. 273] claims that
group discussions may make people more risk taking than their initial ten-
dencies. It is also claimed that established groups exhibit less polarization
than new groups of people that do not know each other, where more profound
polarization is demonstrated (see Myers and Lamm [27]).
Consider two possible situations for a decision maker who is trying to
decide whether to accept or reject a lottery. In the first, he is making his
decision in isolation, while in the second scenario he is part of a group of
individuals, all of them facing a similar problem. Moreover, assume that
the lottery determines only the decision maker’s individual payoffs and does
not affect the well-being of anyone else. Assume further that all choices
are observable. Will the different environments lead to different decisions?
Following the restaurant example we assume they do, and our aim is to
investigate the structure and consequences of these influences.
We assume that each individual is characterized by two sets of preferences:
his true core preferences and his behavioral preferences, where actual choice
is determined by the behavioral preferences. These latter preferences are
observable by all other players and each player has a group influence function
that determines his behavioral preferences as a function of his core preferences
and the observed behavioral preferences of other individuals. Clearly, if he
1So obviously this description fits better a Le Pain Quotidien’s environment rather than
watching Sally in Katz’s Deli.
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is not influenced by others, then his behavioral preferences are the same as
his core preferences. We do not assume a model of preferences evolution, as
individuals’ core preferences do not change as a result of social interaction.
Rather, individuals change their behavior in different social environments
given the behavioral preferences of other individuals in their relevant social
group. When a person moves to a different social environment he may change
his behavior, which is now the outcome of the same core preferences and
a different profile of other people’s behavioral preferences. We emphasize
that our interpretation of the social influence function is of interaction, and
not of aggregation. That is, an individual is influenced by (and influences)
others’ behavior, but he does not try to behave as a social planner by taking
an average (or another combination) of his and other people’s preferences.
Moreover, even if he is aware of the fact that other decision makers are
influenced by his behavior, he does not behave strategically.
We discuss conditions on the social influence functions that guarantee
the existence of such an equilibrium of interdependent behavioral preferences.
We investigate properties of the social influence function which induce simple
adjustments. In particular, we offer conditions under which the core utility
of person i is transformed by a function hi that depends on the average
behavioral utilities of everyone else. According to our analysis, the social
influence does not necessarily imply regression to the mean. It may, for
example, induce all group members to behave as if they are all more (or all
less) risk averse than they really are according to their core preferences.
The different effects of group behavior were discussed both in the eco-
nomic and in the social psychology literature. In a recent discussion, Hoff
and Stiglitz [22] claim that preferences and behavior are endogenous and are
influenced by actions and beliefs of individuals around the decision maker.
In economics the focus is on social learning, externalities and coordination.
When individuals do not have perfect information about the characteristics of
elements in their choice set, conditioning their choice on the choices of other
individuals may be beneficial (for a survey of this literature, see Chamley [9]).
The recognition that individuals care about their relative position or their
status in society has appeared already in the work of Veblen [33]. Such social
concerns also introduce an interdependence between the actions chosen by
individuals that belong to the same social group. The literature have dealt
with this social concerns (like social status, esteem, or popularity) by intro-
ducing them explicitly into the utility function (see for example Bernheim [4],
Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss [18], and Frank [19]). In this approach the
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action chosen by an individual affects directly his social status (for example,
attending college) or it affects the perceptions about his type which deter-
mines his status (e.g., driving a Porsche). As an exception to this approach,
see Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite [11], where incentives to get a higher sta-
tus do not enter directly into the utility but affect the probability of getting
a good matching. When actions signal individuals’ type and social status is
an important concern, Bernheim’s individuals converge to a conformist be-
havior. In other cases individuals would like to choose a product that other
people do not choose simply because they want to be fashionable or different
(see for example Karni and Schmeidler [23]).
Our framework is closely related to Postlewaite [30] (see also Mailath and
Postlewaite [25] and Postlewaite [29]), where two types of preferences are con-
sidered. “Deep preferences,” which capture the immediate satisfaction, and
“reduced form preferences,” which take into account future consequences.
Thus the reduced form preferences capture the fact that preferences over
goods and services are not exogenous but they are in fact endogenous social
constructions that may be affected by the consumption habits of other people
in the group. In particular, with this setup it is possible to discuss the effect
of social norms on behavior and the observation that there is a substantial
differences in behavior among social groups even when their deep preferences
are identical. Our setting focuses on social influence in small groups in which
individuals observe the behavior of other individuals in the group. Our core
preferences may capture any immediate satisfaction as well as future social
consequence, and in particular different types of social norms. Moreover the
type of social interaction that we consider does not necessarily have any fu-
ture social consequences and yet it affects behavior. A possible fusion of the
two settings is a framework with three types of preferences: the deep pref-
erences, the reduced form preferences that capture all the social norms and
social consequences of behavior in a society, and the behavioral preferences
that governs daily decision which depend on frequent interaction in different
social groups in which the observed daily decisions of individuals interact
with one another.
There is a difference between our setting of “social influence” and the
familiar concept of “social preferences” or “interdependence preference” (see,
for example, Charness and Kuhn [10], Fehr and Ga¨chter [16], Sobel [32],
and Fehr and Schmidt [17]). Social preferences imply that the utility of an
individual is exogenously given and does not change, but it may depend on
other people’s outcomes, on the distribution of payoffs, or on the actions
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taken by other people. By assuming such interdependent preferences the
literature focuses for example on altruism, fairness concerns, reciprocity, or
inequality aversion. 2 We do not wish to put restrictions on the nature of
individual preferences and they may be purely egoistic or socially benevolent.
That is, in our setting individuals may have preferences that are defined only
with respect to their own payoffs or they may have social preferences. But
what we assume is that when these individuals need to make decisions their
preferences may be affected by the preferences of other individuals even when
those individuals have no direct economic or strategic interaction with the
decision makers. For example, the decision maker’s degree of risk aversion
or level of altruism may be influenced by other people’s attitude to risk or
altruism.
Our setting focuses on the formation of endogenous behavioral prefer-
ences that are subject to social influence. There is an extensive literature
on preferences formation and on endogenous preferences. One approach,
which is based on evolutionary sociobiology (see Becker [3], Dawkins [13],
and Frank [20]), assumes that people are influenced by “successful” individ-
uals and that they eventually adopt their preferences. For an overview of this
literature, see Samuelson [31]. In this approach, the meaning of “successful”
is exogenously given and typically takes the form of higher monetary pay-
offs. The second approach for endogenous preferences is the dynamic cultural
transmission framework (see Bisin and Verdier [5], Boyd and Richardson [7],
and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [8]). This setting assumes a two stage so-
cialization process. The first is a direct socialization, where parents try to
teach their children to adopt their own cultural identity. Whenever direct so-
cialization fails, children adopt the cultural identity of a random role model.
In our approach we assume that individuals are influenced by all members of
their social group regardless of their relative success, a concept which may
be meaningless, for example, when choosing a meal. Our approach there-
fore captures social influence without introducing any strategic, altruistic, or
evolutionary purpose for such an influence.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up our model
of social influence functions and establish the existence of equilibrium of
behavioral preferences. In section 3 we consider different properties of social
2See also Gul and Pesendorfer [21] who consider interdependence preferences when
individuals care about the intentions of those they interact with. The focus of their paper
is on modelling intentions and how these intentions affect behavior of other individuals.
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influence functions and of behavioral preferences. Section 4 presents a simple
environment in which preferences are represented by a single parameter (like
risk aversion) and shows under what conditions social influence makes players
become more or less extreme. Section 5 provides some concluding comments.
2 Preliminaries
We assume n individuals. Each person i has two continuous vNM utility
functions on outcomes in [a, b]: The first utility, ui, represents his core pref-
erences. The second, vi, represents his behavioral preferences. Since vNM
functions are unique up to positive affine transformations, we assume wlg
that for all i, ui(a) = vi(a) = 0 and ui(b) = vi(b) = 1.
Let B = BL([a, b]) be the set of increasing
3 and continuous real functions
from [a, b] onto [0, 1] which are Lipschitz with the same constant L.4 That
is, for all g ∈ B and x, y ∈ [a, b], |g(x) − g(y)| 6 L|x − y| (this property
is called equi-Lipschitz). We assume throughout that all the core utility
functions ui and all the behavioral utility functions vi are in BL([a, b]) for
some given finite L. We use throughout the supremum metric d(w1, w2) =
supx∈[a,b] |w1(x)− w2(x)|.
The behavioral preferences of individual i depend on his core preferences
and on the behavioral preferences of all other individuals. Formally, the
social influence functions are defined as
vi = fi(ui,v−i)
Where v−i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) and fi : B × Bn−1 → B. We assume
that for every i the functions fi are continuous with respect to the standard
sup norm. If fi(ui,v−i) ≡ ui, then there is no social influence and individual
i behaves according to his core preferences, but in general the behavioral
function vi will be different from the core utility ui.
Social influence (as represented by the functions fi) changes individual
utilities from different outcomes, but also the sensitivity individuals exhibit
3This assumption implies that all agents have the same preferences over sure outcomes,
which rules out the restaurant example and Ariely and Levav’s [1] analysis (see the intro-
duction). Remark 1 in section 3.2 below offers an extension of the present analysis that
permits different preferences over sure outcomes.
4Observe that this is weaker than the standard assumption that the vNM is twice
differentiable and that its derivative is bounded.
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to changes in these outcomes. The first is captured by the values of the
functions vi. Since ui(a) = vi(a) = 0 and ui(b) = vi(b) = 1, it is meaningful
to compare vi(x) and ui(x). For example, the fact that vi(x) > ui(x) indicates
that person i has now higher value of x than before. Sensitivity to changes, on
the other hand, is captured by the derivatives of the utility functions (again,
utilizing the fact that they are all zero at a and 1 at b). But we assume
that there is a limit on how sensitive an agent can be to changes in x, both
in his core and in his behavioral preferences. This limit reflects a physical
or a psychological constraint on individuals’ ability to react to changes. We
denote this upper limit of sensitivity by L, hence the requirement that all
the functions ui and vi are in B.
Our setting assumes a perfect observability of individuals’ behavioral pref-
erences. This might be a strong assumption in some circumstances. We think
about our setting as a benchmark model of social influence. A possible exten-
sion will encompass situations in which individuals observe only some choices
made by other individuals. Such partial observations may still imply a so-
cial influence, but will presumably imply a whole set of possible behavioral
functions vi.
Definition 1 For the profile of core utilities u = (u1, ..., un) and social in-
fluence functions f = (f1, . . . , fn), equilibrium behavioral utilities v
∗(u) =
(v∗1(u), ..., v
∗
n(u)) are such that for every i, v
∗
i (u) = fi(ui,v
∗
−i(u)).
In other words, a vector of behavioral utilities is an equilibrium if when
person i = 1, . . . , n observes the behavioral utilities of everyone else, and
given his core preferences ui, he does not want to deviate from this behavioral
utility.
For a given profile u = (u1, ..., un) and social influence function fi(ui,v−i),
define the following transformation:
f(u,v) ≡ (f1(u1,v−1), ..., fn(un,v−n)) ∈ Bn
Claim 1 For every profile of core utilities u there is a profile of behavioral
utilities v∗(u) such that v∗(u) = f(u,v∗(u)).
Proof : First note that B = BL([a, b]) is a convex compact subset of C([a, b]),
the set of continuous functions on [a, b]. To show this claim we use the
Arzela`-Ascoli theorem (Dunford and Schwarts [15]), stating that if M is
compact, then a set in C(M) is conditionally compact iff it is bounded and
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equicontinuous. Let M = [a, b] and C(M) = B. Equi-Lipschitz implies
equicontinuity of B. The Theorem can be applied to B which is conditionally
compact. Since converging sequences of equi-Lipshitz functions converge to
a Lipshitz function with the same constant, it can be shown that B is closed
and convex.
Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem [15] states that if A is a compact subset of
a locally convex linear topological space then every continuous mapping from
A into itself has a fixed point. The mapping is continuous since the function
f(u,v) is continuous. 
Our setting assumes that both ui and vi are in B. Therefore the social
influence functions that we consider are functions from B to B. Only with
such a restriction existence is guranteed, as Claim 1 does not hold without
it. For example, it fails for n = 2 when vi = ui + vj, i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Such functions cannot be equi-Lipschitz, since the slope of the sum of two
functions with slopes close to L will be larger than L.
3 The Influence Function
Our aim in this section is to present axioms that will lead to a specific form
of the influence functions: A profile of behavioral preferences of everyone but
i leads to a function that depends only on the average utility of that profile,
and the behavioral preferences of person i are obtained by the composition
of this function with his core utility ui. We assume throughout that for all
i, ui(a) = vi(a) = 0 and ui(b) = vi(b) = 1.
3.1 The Average Profile
Symmetry Let π be a permutation of {1, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , n} and let vπ−i =
(vπ(1), . . . , vπ(i−1), vπ(i+1), . . . , vπ(n)). Then fi(ui,v−i) = fi(ui,v
π
−i).
In other words, person i looks for the profile of other people’s behavior
and does not care about who is holding these preferences. In particular, this
assumption rules out the existence of gurus, or even the possibility that each
person has his own reference group.
Betweenness If fi(ui,v−i) = fi(ui,w−i), then fi(ui,v−i) = fi(ui,
1
2
v−i +
1
2
w−i).
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The meaning of this assumption is the following. Suppose that given his
true utility ui, observing the profiles v−i and w−i will lead decision maker i
to update his behavioral preferences in the same way. Then these will also
be his updated preferences if he observes 1
2
v−i +
1
2
w−i which is the profile
where the behavioral utility of person j 6= i is 1
2
vj +
1
2
wj. The rationale for
this axiom is this. The vNM utility vj, representing the observed preferences
of person j, can be defined at x as that probability for which he is indifferent
between receiving x with probability 1 and the lottery (b, vj(x); a, 1− vj(x)),
paying b with probability vj(x) and a with the complementary probability.
(To see why, recall that vj(a) = 0 and vj(b) = 1).
Suppose now that person i does not know whether person j is using
vj or wj. In fact, he believes that there is an equal chance he is using
each of them. With probability 1
2
person j is indifferent between the out-
come x and the lottery (b, vj(x); a, 1 − vj(x)) and with probability 12 he is
indifferent between x and (b, wj(x); a, 1 − wj(x)). In other words, person
i believes that there is an equal chance that the probability that makes
person j indifferent between x and the (b, p; a, 1 − p) is p = vj(x) or p =
wj(x). Following De Finetti’s [14] assertion that probabilities over prob-
abilities are just the compound probabilities, we obtain that the lotter-
ies
(
(b, vj(x); a, 1− vj(x)), 12 ; (b, wj(x); a, wj(x)), 12
)
and
(
b,
vj(x)+wj(x)
2
; a, 1−
vj(x)+wj(x)
2
)
are the same. This means that the above uncertainty regarding
the behavior of person j is in a way equivalent to the situation where the
behavioral preferences of person j are expected utility with the vNM utility
1
2
vj +
1
2
wj. A possible interpretation of the betweenness axiom is therefore
that if v−i and w−i lead person i to the same behavioral preferences, then
being uncertain about which of these two profiles is the correct one leads
person i to the same behavioral preferences.
For a profile v = (v1, . . . , vn), let v−i be the profile of preferences of all
but i, where the preferences of person k 6= i are represented by the vNM
utility vk =
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i vj. That is, v−i is the profile of utilities of all but i,
where the utility of each person j 6= i is the average behavioral utility of all
individuals except for i.
Claim 2 Assume the symmetry and betweenness axioms. If v−i = w−i, then
fi(ui,v−i) = fi(ui,w−i).
Proof : The set {k2−m : k = 0, . . . , 2m, m = 1, . . .} is dense in [0, 1]. It
thus follows by betweenness and the continuity of fi that if fi(ui,v−i) =
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fi(ui,w−i), then for all α ∈ [0, 1], fi(ui,v−i) = fi(ui, αv−i + (1− α)w−i).
Assume for simplicity that i = n and define (v1, . . . , vn−1) ≈ (v′1, . . . ,
v′n−1) iff fn(un, v1, . . . , vn−1) = fn(un, v
′
1, . . . , v
′
n−1). Also, let v˜j = (vj, . . . ,
vn−1, v1, . . . , vj−1). Then by symmetry v˜1 ≈ . . . ≈ v˜n−1. Let (s1, . . . , sn−1),
s1 + . . .+ sn−1 = 1 stand for
∑n−1
j=1 sjv˜j, and obtain as before
(1, 0, . . . , 0) ≈ (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ≈ . . . ≈ (0, . . . , 0, 1) ≈
(1
2
, 1
2
, 0, . . . , 0) ≈ (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0) ≈ . . . ≈ ( 1
n−1
, . . . , 1
n−1
)
It thus follows that
fi(ui,v−i) = fi(ui,v−i) = fi(ui,w−i) = fi(ui,w−i)
Hence the claim. 
By this claim, the behavioral prefrences vi of person i are a function of his
core preferences ui and the average behavioral preferences of everyone else.
This is a big simplification as the social influence function fi is a lot easier
to analyze.
3.2 Probability Equivalents
Next we offer assumptions that further restrict the nature of the functions fi.
Although what follows can be expressed in terms of preferences, it is some-
times easier to do it with representation functions. In all cases, X, Y, Z, . . .
denote lotteries and x, y, z, . . . denote outcomes. By u(X) we mean the ex-
pected utility of X with respect to the utility u etc. The preferences that are
represented by u and v are u and v. δx is the lottery that yields x with
probability 1.
Consider two utility functions ui and u˜i, and let x and x
′ have the same
“probability equivalences” with respect to these utilities. That is, there exists
a probability p such that ui(x) = ui(b, p; a, 1− p) and u˜i(x′) = u˜i(b, p; a, 1−
p). Similarly to the discussion following the betweenness assumption, we
interpret this probability as the utility derived from x. The fact that ui(x) =
ui(b, p; a, 1 − p) and u˜i(x′) = u˜i(b, p; a, 1 − p) indicates that the intensity of
preferences for x of a person with the utility function u is similar to the
intensity of preferences for x′ of a person with the utility u˜. Let both be
now exposed to the same residual profile v−i of everyone else to obtain the
corresponding behavioral utilities vi = fi(ui,v−i) and v˜i = fi(u˜i,v−i). Since
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the same influence applies to the same utility levels, we suggest that the
behavioral utilities too will be the same. That is, x and x′ still have the same
probability equivalences (which may be different than before). Formally:
Influence Probability Equivalence Let x and x′ be such that ui(x) =
ui(b, p; a, 1 − p) and u˜i(x′) = u˜i(b, p; a, 1 − p). Then for every v−i,
vi(x) = vi(b, q; a, 1−q) iff v˜i(x′) = v˜i(b, q; a, 1−q), where vi = fi(ui,v−i)
and v˜i = fi(u˜i,v−i).
Once again, we assume that the v-value of an outcome (that is, its value
under the observed behavior) depends on the core value of this outcome and
on the profile of the behavioral preferences of other people, but not on the
core value of other outcomes.
Claim 3 The influence probability equivalence assumption holds iff for every
v−i there exists a function h
i
v−i
: [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that
fi(ui,v−i) = h
i
v−i
◦ ui
That is, the core utility function ui of person i is transformed by a function
hi which depends only on v−i, the vector of the behavioral utility functions
of everyone else. Observe that this claim does not require the symmetry or
the betweenness assumptions.
Proof : To simplify notation, we omit the index i throughout this proof
(except for v−i). Let u
∗(x) = x−a
b−a
, and let v∗ = f(u∗,v−i). Define hv−i :
[0, 1]→ [0, 1] by
h
v−i
(y) = v∗([b− a]y + a) (1)
We now show that for every u, the transformed function v = f(u,v−i) is
given by v = h
v−i
◦ u. That is, we want to show that for all u and x,
v(x) = h
v−i
(u(x)) (2)
By definition, this holds for u∗ and v∗.
Pick x ∈ [a, b]. We assumed that u(a) = 0 and u(b) = 1, hence
δx ∼u (b, u(x); a, 1− u(x))
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By the definition of u∗,
δx′ ∼u∗ (b, u(x); a, 1− u(x))⇐⇒
x′ − a
b− a = u(x)⇐⇒
x′ = (b− a)u(x) + a (3)
By the Influence Probability Equivalence assumption,
δx ∼v (b, q; a, 1− q)⇐⇒ δx′ ∼v∗ (b, q; a, 1− q)
That is, v(x) = q iff v∗(x′) = q. By eq. (3), v(x) = q iff v∗([b−a]u(x)+a) = q.
By eq. (1) we get that
h
v−i
(u(x)) = q ⇐⇒
v∗([b− a]u(x) + a) = q ⇐⇒
f(u∗([b− a]u(x) + a),v−i) = q ⇐⇒
f(u(x),v−i) = q ⇐⇒
v(x) = q
Since all functions are strictly increasing this implies eq. (2). 
The results of this section are summarized by the following theorem:
Theorem 1 The social influence functions satisfy the symmetry, between-
ness, and influence probability equivalence iff the connection between the core
and behavioral utility functions is given by vi = h
i
v−i
◦ ui.
Theorem 1 expresses the social transformation function in terms of the
average behavioral preferences of the other individuals in the group. So
far we’ve assumed that the size of the group is fixed, but the size of the
influence group may matter. A conformist will probably put more weight on
the behavioral preferences of others when the size of the group is larger. On
the other hand, some people may ignore mass behavior and will concentrate
on a small reference group. Since these effects are beyond our discussion, we
just note here that the transformation function hi may be indexed by n in
order to capture the effect of the group size.
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Following Theorem 1, all the information regarding the rest of the group
is summarized by the average of their observed behavioral utilities. For a
given n we can therefore consider the influence function as if there are two
persons only, and index the adjustment rule hi
v−i
by the size of the group
n− 1.
It is important to note that even though we adopt the betweenness as-
sumption, and therefore for every particular individual the transformation
of his preferences depends only on the average behavioral preferences of the
other individuals, the equilibrium behavioral preferences do depend on the
distribution of core preferences (and not just on average preferences). The
reason is that every individual sees a different average behavior of a different
subset of individuals and therefore the distribution of the averages v−i does
depend on the distribution of preferences and not just on the averages. The
different v−i vectors affect other members of the group and indirectly the
behavioral preferences of individual i himself.
Remark 1 The analysis of the previous sections can be extended to multi-
variate preferences, provided complete separability of both ui and vi is as-
sumed on
∏k
ℓ=1[a
ℓ, bℓ].
Complete Separability: For every ℓ, (x−ℓ, xℓ)  (y−ℓ, xℓ) iff (x−ℓ, yℓ) 
(y−ℓ, yℓ).
It is well known (see Blackorby, Primont, and Russell [6] for a standard
reference) that a preference relation is completely separable iff it has an
additively separable representation of the form
∑k
ℓ=1 ψ
ℓ(xℓ). Applying our
axioms to this setup while holding all variables but one fixed, we get that
the behavioral preferences of person i can be represented by vi =
∑k
ℓ=1 v
ℓ
i ,
where vℓi = (h
ℓ)i
v
ℓ
−i
◦uℓi . These preferences differ from each other even on sure
outcome, where no uncertainty is involved.
4 Does social influence make individuals mo-
re extreme?
Suppose that a person finds out that he is not alone in his core preferences
which are represented by the utility u. Everyone else behaves according to
this utility (recall that he can observe others’ behavior, but not their core
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preferences). How should he react? The answer depends of course on the
reason other people’s behavior affects his behavior. If he wants to serve
as a representative of this reference group, then the unanimity assumption
of social choice theory seems appropriate. If all preferences are the same,
then the social aggregator should agree with this preference relation. But
the social interaction modeled here is different. Our story is of a decision
maker who is uncertain what preferences he should have. For example, if he
believes that he hates risk more than other people, then when he observes that
everyone he knows behaves in a way that is similar to his true preferences,
his reaction may well be to become more risk averse, in the same way that
a person who knows that he enjoys action movies will make sure not to miss
a new 007 movie that did well in the box-office on the first weekend. Other
reactions are also possible — the decision maker may become less risk averse
when everyone else behaves according to his true preferences, or his updated
preferences may depend on how risk averse are his true preferences.
To simplify the analysis, we assume in this section that all core and
behavioral utility functions belong to a single-parameter set of functionsW =
{wα : α ∈ [0, 1]}. For concreteness we focus on risk averse agents whose risk
aversion is captured by the single parameter α, where a higher α represents
a higher level of risk aversion. In order to utilize theorem 1, we assume that
for all i, v−i ∈ W . This implies that there are w0 and w1 such that W is
given by wα = αw1 + (1− α)w0.
Claim 4 Let W = {wα : 0 6 α 6 1} such that
1. ∀α, wα(0) = 0, wα(1) = 1, wα is increasing and continuous.
2. ∀x, αn → α implies wαn(x)→ wα(x).
3. ∀α, β ∈ [0, 1] and ∀δ ∈ [0, 1], δwα + (1− δ)wβ ∈ W.
4. ∀x, α < β =⇒ wα(x) 6 wβ(x).
Then W = {γw1 + (1− γ)w0 : γ ∈ [0, 1]}.
Proof : Suppose not. Then ∃w ∈ W and ∃x, y ∈ (0, 1) such that w(x) =
γw1(x) + (1− γ)w0(x) and w(y) = γ′w1(y) + (1− γ′)w0(y) where γ 6= γ′. By
the third assumption, for all (a, b) in the triangle
A := △{(w1(x), w1(y)), (w0(x), w0(y)), (w(x), w(y))}
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there is w˜ ∈ W such that w˜(x) = a and w˜(y) = b. But then
A ⊂ {(wα(x), wα(y))}
a contradiction, as {(wα(x), wα(y))} is a continuous mapping of [0, 1] into
ℜ2. 
In the sequel, we assume that wα = αw1+(1−α)w0 (and not, for example,
that wα =
√
αw1 + (1−
√
α)w0). In particular, if for all j, vj = βjw1 + (1−
βj)w0, then v−i = βj 6=iw1 + (1− βj 6=i)w0, where βj 6=i = 1n−1
∑
j 6=i βj.
The above analysis describes an adjustment rule where for each person,
his core αi is transformed by the observed profile β−i of the other individuals
into a new parameter βi. Formally, βi = g˜
i(αi,β−i) which by claim 2 and the
previous argument equals gi(αi,βj 6=i). Such a function can be represented as
in Theorem 1, as we can define hβ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] by hβ(α) = g(α, β). Our
present analysis is therefore consistent with the structure of the previous
section.
We suggest two assumptions regarding the adjustment rules. 1. When
his true preferences become more risk averse, the decision maker’s behavior
will become more risk averse (that is, g1 =
∂g
∂α
> 0), but the change will
not be greater than the original change (that is, g1 6 1); and 2. When
the average of the observed preferences of the others becomes more risk
averse, the decision maker’s behavior will not become less risk averse (hence
g2 =
∂g
∂β
> 0), but here too g2 < 1. The assumptions regarding the derivatives
being less than 1 need some clarification. WhenW is a general parameterized
set, the index α is purely ordinal and no information beyond its sign can
be deduced from the derivative with respect to it. But in our structure,
where uα = αw1 + (1− α)w0, α has some cardinal properties, and therefore
the magnitude of derivatives with respect to it are also meaningful. The
assumption g2 < 1 means that when the average of the behavioral functions
of all other players moves ε in the direction of w1 or w0, the behavioral
function of i will move by less than ε in the same direction.
Given the adjustment rules βi = g
i(αi,βj 6=i), i = 1, . . . , n, an equilibrium
is a vector (β1, . . . , βn) solving
βi = g
i(αi,βj 6=i), i = 1, . . . , n (4)
This equilibrium is depicted in fig. 1 for the case n = 2. Curve A represents
the value of β1 as the response of person 1 to possible observed values β2
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β1
β2
A : β1 = g
1(α1, β2)
B : β2 = g
2(α2, β1)
r
Figure 1: Equilibrium
of person 2, and curve B represents the response of person 2 to β1. The
equilibrium point is r.
Claim 5 The equilibrium point of eq. (4) is unique.
Proof: Suppose that for a given vector α there are two different equilibrium
vectors β and β′. Note that if for some k, β
′
j 6=k = βj 6=k, then βk = β
′
k. There
is therefore k for which |β′j 6=k − βj 6=k| 6= 0.
Next, there is j∗ such that |β′j∗ − βj∗ | > |β
′
j 6=j∗ − βj 6=j∗| > 0. To see
why, observe that β
′
j 6=j∗ − βj 6=j∗ = 1n−1
∑
j 6=j∗ [β
′
j − βj]. If β
′
j 6=j∗ > βj 6=j∗ ,
then there is j∗ such that β′j∗ − βj∗ > β
′
j 6=j∗ − βj 6=j∗ , and if β
′
j 6=j∗ < βj 6=j∗ ,
then there is j∗ such that β′j∗ − βj∗ 6 β
′
j 6=j∗ − βj 6=j∗ . The adjustment rule
for person j∗ stands in contradiction to the assumption that g2 < 1, since
β′j∗ − βj∗ = g(αj∗ ,β
′
j 6=j∗)− g(αj∗ ,βj 6=j∗). 
We now analyze some specific situations in order to get a better insight
into the nature of the function g.
4.1 Identical Agents
We say that two agents are identical if they have the same social influence
function and the same core preferences. Our assumptions imply that two
identical agents will have the same behavioral preferences. For example,
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if αi = αj but βi > βj, then by the assumption that g2 > 0 it follows
that βj = g(α,
1
n−1
(βi +
∑
k 6=i,j βk)) > g(α,
1
n−1
(βj +
∑
k 6=i,j βk)) = βi, a
contradiction.
Define G(α) to be the behavioral equilibrium when all agents’ core pref-
erences are α, that is, G(α) satisfies
G(α) = g(α,G(α)) (5)
(Recall that when each of the other n − 1 behavioral index is G(α), then
so is the average of these indexes). The properties of g at the point (α, α)
determine the location of G(α), above or below α. If g(α, α) = α, then so is
G(α). That is, if for each player i, the fact that the average behavioral index
of all others is identical to his core preferences does not push him to deviate
from these core preferences, then in equilibrium all players will use their core
preferences. Otherwise,
Claim 6 G(α) ≷ α iff g(α, α) ≷ α.
Proof : Suppose that g(α, α) > α but G(α) < α. Since g2 < 1, it follows
that
β < α =⇒ g(α, β) > β (6)
Otherwise, if g(α, β) 6 β, we get that g(α, α)− g(α, β) > α − β. Note that
since G(α) is an equilibrium, it follows as in eq. (5) that G(α) = g(α,G(α)).
Since G(α) < α we get by eq. (6) that g(α,G(α)) > G(α), a contradiction.
Moreover, if G(α) = α, the equation G(α) = g(α,G(α)) contradicts the
assumption g(α, α) > α.
Similarly, if g(α, α) < α, G(α) cannot be above α , and it must be strictly
below it. 
4.2 Same Influence Functions, Different Core Prefer-
ences
We now turn to discuss the asymmetric case in which agents have different
core preferences. First, we show that the influence process does not reverse
the order of the agents’ risk aversion. That is, if the core preferences of
person j are more risk averse than those of person i, then he will also behave
in a more risk averse pattern. Formally:
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Claim 7 The vectors β and α are comonotonic. That is, for all i, j, (αi −
αj)(βi − βj) > 0.
Proof : Suppose, for example, that αi < αj but βj < βi. Then, since
g1, g2 > 0,
βi = g(αi,
1
n−1
(βj +
∑
k 6=i,j βk)) < g(αj,
1
n−1
(βi +
∑
k 6=i,j βk)) = βj
A contradiction. 
We want to show that it cannot be the case that the less risk averse agents
will become even less risk averse while the more risk averse agents will move
in the opposite direction. This follows from the stronger claim 8 below.
Definition 2 The social influence makes agents i and j more extreme if
αi < αj and βi < αi while αj < βj.
We now show that it is never the case that two agents will move away
from each other. That is, if αi < αj and αj < βj, then it is impossible that
βi < αi. Formally:
Claim 8 It is never the case that the social influence makes agents i and j
more extreme.
Proof: Consider the two profiles α = (α1, . . . , αn) and α
′ = (α′1, . . . , α
′
n)
together with the corresponding behavioral profiles β = (β1, . . . , βn) and
β′ = (β′1, . . . , β
′
n), where
1. For k 6= i, j, αk = α′k and βk = β′k,
2. α′i = α
′
j = α
∗ and β′i = β
′
j = β
∗ :=
βi+βj
2
,
3. α∗ is chosen such that β∗ = g(α∗, 1
n−1
[
∑
k 6=i,j βk + β
∗]).
The existence of α∗ is guaranteed by continuity and monotonicity. The profile
β′ corresponds to α′ because for k 6= i, j, his core preferences are the same
and the average behavioral coefficients of everyone else is the same in both
profiles.
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Suppose first that β∗ > α∗. Then αi 6 α
∗. To see why, observe that if
α∗ < αi, then
βi 6 β
∗ = g
(
α∗,
1
n− 1
[∑
k 6=i,j
βk + β
∗
])
<
g
(
αi,
1
n− 1
[∑
k 6=i,j
βk + β
∗
])
6
g
(
αi,
1
n− 1
[∑
k 6=i
βk
])
= βi
A contradiction. Since 0 < g1 6 1 and g2 > 0,
g(αi,
1
n−1
∑
k 6=i βk) >
g(αi,
1
n−1
[
∑
k 6=i,j βk + β
∗]) >
g(α∗, 1
n−1
[
∑
k 6=i,j βk + β
∗])− [α∗ − αi] =
β∗ − [α∗ − αi] > αi
The proof of the case β∗ < α∗ is similar. 
Suppose that α1 6 . . . 6 αn. By claim 8, there are three possible types
of equilibria:
1. For all i, αi 6 βi
2. For all i, αi > βi
3. For all i 6 i∗, αi 6 βi, for all i > i
∗, αi > βi.
We cannot give exact conditions for each of the three types to emerge, but
some sufficient conditions follow. First, by claim 6, if for all α, g(α, α) > α
and all agents have the same core preferences α, then they will all have the
same behavioral preferences β > α. If for a sufficient small ε, α − ε 6 α1 <
. . . < αn 6 α + ε, then by claim 7 and continuity, αn < β1 < . . . < βn (case
1 above). Case 2 is likewise obtained when for all α, g(α, α) < α.
Note that despite claim 8 that precludes the possibility that social in-
fluence makes the individuals more extreme, it is still possible that social
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influence yields a higher variance of the agents’ risk aversion. This is pos-
sible for example when αi 6 βi for all i but the increase in risk aversion is
higher at high levels of α.
If, when the average of the observed behavior of everyone else and the
decision maker’s core preference coincide the decision maker behaves accord-
ing to his core preferences, then the equilibrium (for all distributions of core
preferences) is of the third type. This follows by the fact that if g(α, α) ≡ α,
then when α1 6 . . . 6 αn, β1 > α1 and βn 6 αn. To see why this is the case,
denote βˆ = 1
n−1
∑
i>1 βi. By claim 7, β1 6 βi for all i > 2, hence α1 6 βˆ.
By Claim 2, the behavioral preferences of person 1 are the same if the be-
havioral preferences of all other individuals are replaced by βˆ. But g2 > 0,
α1 = g(α1, α1) 6 g(α1, βˆ) = β1. The proof for the case βn 6 αn is similar.
4.3 A Possible Application: Committee Deliberation
In this subsection we offer an application of our approach to the analysis of
deliberation by committees or juries. Starting from Condorcet [12] there are
numerous studies on decision making by committees, but the focus of this
literature has been on the importance of pre-voting debates and deliberation
on information aggregation. Given that committee members have different
goals and preferences, this literature considers the incentives they have to
reveal their private information or to acquire information (for a recent survey
of this literature see Li and Suen [24]). However, efforts to convince and to
persuade others are not done only by providing new information, but also by
efforts to change others’ preferences regarding the subject being deliberated.
To illustrate the usefulness of our setup, consider a committee that needs
to vote on a certain issue, but prior to voting there is a deliberation stage.
During this stage committee members explain, argue, and try to convince
and influence each other. The effect of deliberation can be captured by our
social influence procedure where each individual votes according to his be-
havioral preferences which depend on his core preferences and the behavioral
preferences of committee members that participate in the deliberation.
Committees may have different voting and deliberation procedures. In
some cases members do not have to express their opinion before the voting
stage, i.e., they may choose only to listen without expressing their opinion.
Or the rules may be that members must explain their decision (e.g., judges
that sit together on the bench). There are committees in which members
do not have to attend meetings — they may just send their written ballots
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or they may even decide not to vote at all. Voting can be done simulta-
neously or sequentially (and in a different order). Adopting our setup the
different procedures may affect the formation of the behavioral preferences
and therefore the outcome of the committee’s voting.
5 Discussion and Concluding Comments
The approach taken in this paper is that humans are social animals that keep
interacting with one another. The interaction does not affect only payoffs but
also preferences. We depart from the approach that takes humans as given
with fixed preferences and adopt a framework in which preference changes
depend on social interaction and social influence. Our approach tries to
capture the effect of social interaction on preferences and behavior without
introducing any strategic or evolutionary purpose for such an influence.
There are two important assumptions in our setup: symmetry and ob-
servability. One can extend our setup and consider a model in which each
individual is affected only by a subset of individuals. This can be captured
by mapping the details of social influence into a directed social network such
there is a directed link between player i and j only if player i affects the
preferences of player j. We can go further and assume that the weight of
each link in the sphere of social influence is different. The social influence
equilibrium for this case can be defined in the same way as in Definition 1
while restricting the formation of behavioral preferences to the specific struc-
ture of the weighted directed network. The sensitivity of the distribution of
behavioral preferences to the structure of the social network is potentially
interesting.
Our second assumption of full observability can also be modified. One
can assume that individuals have beliefs about the behavioral preferences
of other individuals and they update those beliefs whenever they observe
behavior. The influence function is then defined as a function of one’s core
preferences and his beliefs about the preferences of others.
Our social influence approach may give rise to a dynamic model of pref-
erences evolution. Individual preferences evolve over time depending on the
preferences of the individuals they interact with. The evolution can also be
with respect to the core preferences, and they too may change over time.
In such a model preferences may reflect the history of social interaction of
individuals.
21
We focused in our analysis on risk aversion as our leading example. But
as we pointed out in the introduction, the literature on social psychology
suggests that group interaction affects different types of attitudes and pref-
erences; a phenomenon labeled as group polarization. Our approach is there-
fore also relevant in the discussion of preferences for competition and equality
which have been the focus of recent economic literature (see for example Fehr
and Schmidt [17] for inequality aversion and Niederle and Vesterlund [28] for a
discussion on preferences for competition)). That is, when agents with given
preferences for competition interact with others, they may find themselves
at the end of the interaction with different attitudes towards competition
from those they had at the beginning. It would be interesting to investigate
under what type of social influence group interaction makes people more
competitive, or make them more (or less) averse to inequality.
References
[1] Ariely, D. and J. Levav, 2000. “Sequential choice in group setting: Tak-
ing the road less traveled and less enjoyed,” Journal of Consumer Re-
search, 27:279–290.
[2] Aronson, E., 2010. Social Psychology . Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle
River, NJ.
[3] Becker, G.S., 1970. “Altruism, egoism and genetic fitness: Economics
and sociobiology,” J. Econ. Lit. 14:817–826.
[4] Bernheim, D.B., 1994. “A Theory of conformity,” Journal of Political
Economy , 102:841–877.
[5] Bisin A, and T. Verdier, 2001. “The Economics of Cultural transmission
and the dynamics of Preferences,” Jour. of Econ. Theory , 97:298–319.
[6] C. Blackorby, D. Primont, and R.R. Russell, “Duality, Separability,
and Functional Structure: Theory and Economic Applications,” North-
Holland, New York, 1978.
[7] Boyd, R. and P. Richardson, 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Pro-
cess, University of Chicago Press.
22
[8] Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. and M. Feldman, 1973. “Culture versus biological
inheritance: phenotypic transmission from parents to children,” Amer.
J. Human Genetics, 25:618–637.
[9] Chamley, C., 2004. Rational herds: Economic models of social learning .
Cambridge University Press..
[10] Charness, G. and P. Kuhn, 2011. “Lab labor: What can labor economists
learn in the lab?,” Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 4a, 229–330.
[11] Cole, H.L., G.J. Mailath, and A. Postlewaite, 1992. “Social norms, sav-
ings behavior, and growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 100:1092–
1125.
[12] Condorcet, M.J.A.N. de Caritat, 1785. “An essay on the application of
analysis to the probability of decisions rendered by a plurality of voters,”
abridged and translated in I. McLean and A.B. Urken, eds. Classics of
Social Choice, 1995. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
[13] Dawkins, R., 1976. The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[14] De Finetti, B., 1977. “Probabilities of probabilities: A real problem
or a misunderstanding?” in New Developments in the Applications of
Bayesian Methods, ed. by A. Aykac and C. Brumat. Amsterdam: North
Holland.
[15] Dunford N. and J.T. Schwartz, 1958. Linear Operators, Vol. 1. Wiley-
Interscience: New York
[16] Fehr, E. and S. Ga¨chter, 2000. “Fairness and retaliation: The economics
of reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14:159–181.
[17] Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt, 1999. “A theory of fairness, competition
and Cc-operation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:817–868.
[18] Fershtman, C., K.M. Murphy, and Y. Weiss, 1996. “Social status, edu-
cation, and growth,” Journal of Political Economy , 104:108–132.
[19] Frank, R.H., 1985. “The Demand for unobservable and other nonposi-
tional goods,” American Economic Review 75:101–16.
23
[20] Frank, R., 1987. “If Homo Economicus could choose its own utility func-
tion: would he want one with a conscience?” Amer. Econ. Rev. 77:593–
604.
[21] Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer. “Interdependent preference models as a
theory of intentions,” Journal of Economic Theory , forthcoming.
[22] Hoff, K. and J.E. Stiglitz, 2015. “Striving for Balance in Economics:
Towards a Theory of the Social Determination of Behavior,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.
[23] Karni E. and D. Schmeidler, 1990. “Fixed Preferences and Changing
Tastes,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 80:262–
267.
[24] Li, H. and W. Suen, 2009.“Decision making in Committee,” Canadian
Journal of Economics 42:359–392.
[25] Mailath G.J. and A. Postlewaite, 2003. “The social context of economics
decisions,” J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 1:354–362.
[26] Myers, D.G., 1975. “Discussion-induced attitude polarization,” Human
Relations 28:699–714.
[27] Myers, D.G. and H. Lamm, 1976. “The group polarization phe-
nomenon,” Psychological Bulletin 83:602–627.
[28] Nierdele, M. and Vesterlund, 2007. “Do women shy away from compe-
tition? Do men compete too much?” Quarterly Journal of Economics
122:1067–1101
[29] Postlewaite, A., 2001. “Social arrangements and social behavior,” Ann.
Econ. Stat. 63-64:67–87.
[30] Postlewaite, A., 2011. “Social norms and social assets,” Annu. Rev.
Econ. 3:239–59.
[31] Samuelson, L., 2001. “Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences,”
Journal of Economic Theory , 97:225–230.
[32] Sobel, J., 2005. “Interdependent preferences and reciprocity,” Journal
of Economic Literature 43:396–440.
24
[33] Veblen, T., 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study
in the Evolution of Institutions. London: Macmillan, 1899. Reprint.
London: Unwin, 1970.
25
